Iran’s Military Resilience: Beyond the Boasts of Obliteration
Following three weeks of intense military operations targeting Iran’s missile facilities, pronouncements of complete obliteration have been met with a more nuanced reality by defence experts. While significant damage has been inflicted, the notion that Iran’s military and naval capabilities have been entirely dismantled is being challenged. Analysts suggest the conflict is far more complex and potentially protracted than initially portrayed by Washington.
Donald Trump, in a recent statement, declared that “100% of Iran’s Military capability” had been destroyed. However, this assertion stands in contrast to the ongoing reality on the ground. Experts point out that despite the US-led bombardment, Iran continues to deploy drones and missiles against Israel and Gulf states, indicating a capacity that is far from extinguished.
The timeline and on-the-ground situation paint a picture of a conflict that could extend for weeks, or even months, if a withdrawal by the US and Israel is not forthcoming. While Iran’s missile production capacity has undoubtedly suffered, it is not a case of complete annihilation. Geopolitical analyst Dmitri Alperovitch noted that Iranian forces have been consistently launching approximately 30 missiles and 70 drones daily over a recent fortnight, causing damage across the Middle East.
Even Trump conceded the ease with which Iran can still project force, stating, “it is easy for Iran to send a drone or two, drop a mine, or deliver a close-range missile somewhere along, or in, this Waterway [Strait of Hormuz], no matter how badly defeated they are.” Experts concur with this assessment, suggesting that Iran’s ability to sustain such attacks could continue for “at least for weeks, maybe longer, at this rate of fire.”
Understanding Iran’s Arsenal: Stockpiles and Production
Precise figures on Iran’s missile stockpile remain elusive, making it difficult to quantify the exact impact of the US-Israeli bombardment. However, Alperovitch estimates that Iran possessed around 3,000 missiles before the conflict. Given the sustained rate of fire, it is reasonable to infer that “they likely have hundreds left to enable that.”
Iran has also heavily relied on its Shahed drones, which are cost-effective and relatively simple to produce, not requiring the same level of specialised expertise or advanced infrastructure. This suggests that Iran is likely to maintain its drone production capabilities. Nevertheless, Alperovitch observes that the number of drone attacks has seen a “definitely degraded” state, falling by an estimated 85 per cent.
Reports indicate that Israeli military and US forces have struck over 15,000 targets, resulting in the deaths of approximately 50 Iranian officials. Israel claims to have destroyed around two-thirds of Iran’s missile launchers, and a Western official suggested to Bloomberg that as much as 80 per cent of Iran’s offensive capability had been eliminated. Despite these claims, Iranian missile attacks persist, with over 2,000 drones launched at the Gulf region thus far, according to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, with no indication of a slowdown.
The Marathon Mentality: Iran’s Strategic Approach
Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stated at a Pentagon press conference that there is no “definitive timeframe” for the war’s conclusion, and US attacks will cease only at Trump’s discretion. Despite declaring success in degrading Iran’s missile production and naval capabilities, the Pentagon does not appear to believe Tehran is on the verge of surrender.
Dr. Renad Mansour, a senior research fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, explains that “From Iran’s perspective, this is being seen as a long war; a marathon where you might have times when there are more missiles, times when there are fewer missiles being launched.” She elaborates that Iran has been preparing for such an eventuality since the June war of the previous year, understanding that it would be an asymmetrical conflict where they could not match American and Israeli military might and intelligence. However, Iran possesses certain strategic advantages.
Tehran is engaging in this conflict across “different types of battlefields,” according to Dr. Mansour. By disrupting the global economy, Iran aims to entangle the US in a prolonged conflict, thereby preventing a scenario where the US can simply withdraw and claim victory. Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is a key tactic in this economic warfare, designed to level the playing field in the absence of comparable military stockpiles.
Tehran’s objective, as described by Dr. Mansour, is to “bring about chaos, to show what a bad idea this was by the US and Israel.” Furthermore, despite improved relations with Dubai and the wider Gulf, Iran is signaling that “enough is enough,” and while it may endure initial setbacks, “things are going to be different.”
A War on Two Fronts: Diversified Strategy
Alperovitch posits that Iran is fighting on two distinct fronts. The US military is primarily focused on Iran’s ballistic missile program and its navy. Concurrently, Israel is engaged in a campaign aimed at regime destabilisation through the assassination of high-ranking Iranian officials.
This approach highlights Iran’s strategy of “mosaic defence,” a decentralised leadership model designed to ensure the continuity of operations even if senior leadership is incapacitated. Instead of relying on a singular command structure, power is distributed across multiple geographic and organisational chains of command, with clear lines of succession.
“Assassinating military commanders may feel good, but there’ll always be a cadre of people to replace them,” Alperovitch notes, adding, “These assassinations, I’m not certain they are actually accomplishing a whole lot in terms of degrading command control.”
The Israeli strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field, which prompted an immediate Iranian retaliation against gas production facilities in Qatar, demonstrates that Iran’s “command and control is not destroyed” as it can “retaliate and escalate… within hours.”
Alperovitch acknowledges that the US could “potentially declare victory” regarding its stated objectives of severely degrading Iran’s missile production capacity and its navy. However, for Dr. Mansour, the concept of victory is more ambiguous. She questions, “What does victory look like? What does a mission accomplished even look like?” She concludes that the outcome will be a weakened but still disruptive regime in the region. While degraded, these systems can be reconstituted, making a definitive “mission accomplished” difficult to define.
